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Is There a Well Defined Scientific Method?
A Psychologist's Answer
WILLIAM R. CHARLESWORTH
Institute of Child Development, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis
ABSTRACT - The question "Is there a well defined scientific method?" can be answered in three
ways: by referring to existing discourse on the nature of method; by pointing to concrete examples in which the method is applied in real life situations; and by creating a taxonomy of the
behavioral ond psychological operations that constitute the scientific process. The last way was
proposed as the most fruitful of the three. Two major classes of operations and their subclasses
were discussed, along with operations of thought and behavior that are antithetical to scientific
method. The importance of the psychologist's contribution to answering philosophicol questions
that are ultimotely based on human behavior and cognition was stressed.

There are at least three approaches to the problem of
determining whether there is a "well defined scientific
method." The first approach involves an analysis of the
concepts, terms, and rules that constitute all of what we
know about the scientific method. The second approach
is more or less that of the empiricist who shuns conceptual analysis and resorts, instead, to pointing to actual
scientists and concrete instances in which the majority
agrees that the scientific method is being applied. The
third approach is both a blend of the first two and, I believe, an innovation, since it requires the application of
the tools of modern psychology to a problem that, as far
as I am aware, has not been so attacked.
When I learned about the topic of the symposium, my
first reaction was to adopt the first approach. I turned to
dictionaries, the Brittanica, the works of some philosophers of science, and even to a few introductory biology
and physics texts in which the first chapters nearly always have a few general statements on the nature of the
scientific method. Despite differences in emphasis, there
was a substantial amount of agreement among these
sources. In brief, "scientific" is an adjective referring to
behaviors, verbal statements, or other symbolic representation that are in accord with the rules, principles, or
methods of science. Science itself is generally considered
to be a body of knowledge containing, as its most simple
unit, theoretical or empirical propositions, whose aim is
to elicit universal assent on matters concerning the empirical order of things. Such assent is usually accorded
( and often only provisionally) such propositions after
careful examination of the procedures employed by the
scientist to arrive at the propositions. For example, if a
scientist claims that variables A and B are related, his
audience has the right to examine the proposition in
terms of what he actually did (the method he actually
used) to get to the position where he could actually make
such a claim. It is thus quite apparent that method itself is an important part of what we mean by scientific.
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The word "method" derives from the Greek methodos
having to do with a way or path to some destination. But
a way of going toward something is not all that is meant
by the word as we use it today. What is further implied
is that the way is an orderly, systematic, and conventionally established mode of doing something. Synonyms for
it are "procedure," "rule," "systematic fashion," and
"manner." That is, the word "method" implies a planned,
predetermined, and systematic way of accomplishing an
end or arriving at a goal. Second-level implications of the
term are ( I ) that we are conscious of all aspects of the
method used (we are conscious of it because we are directly responsible for constructing it - or vice versa hence, it is determinate and predictable), and (2) that
we can transmit the method to others once having learned
it ourselves.
So far the written sources have done us well. We
could read further and discover that scientific method entails observing, producing hypotheses, conducting experiments to test the hypotheses, drawing conclusions, making inductive and deductive inferences, etc. The list could
easily be extended, and we could learn much of what
goes into employing the method by means of the first
approach. If all this is so, why not be satisfied with the
way things are? Why not consider the question posed to
this panel as already answered in the books? As a psychologist, I don't know exactly why we should not be
satisfied. The person who asked it was, in our terminology, motivated by epistemic curiosity, and the longer I
think about the question, the more my epistemic curiosity is also aroused and the less satisfied I become with
answers from written sources.
With dissatisfaction with the first approach implanted
in at least two of us, let us go now to the second. The
second approach, at first glance, is in some ways revolutionary and at the same time defeatist. The proponents
of it say, in effect, "Why quibble with words about method and how well- or ill-defined it is? Break out of the
language game and look at reality. Look at scientists
themselves and what they do. It's all very simple. The
way they do what they do is their method." What these
proponents are suggesting is that we ignore written discussion and theories about method and build up an answer to the question by looking at scientist after scienThe Minnesota Academy of Science

tist, instance after instance, in which the scientific method
is employed. We should do this in the same way that we
gradually build up a composite image of a Republican
or Democrat by attending convention after convention.
The obvious hope underlying all this is that after exposure to n + l number of instances in which the scientific method is observed in action, we should soon develop a concept of method and, ultimately, some idea of
how well defined the method is. This approach has one
advantage: It forces us to look at method as it actually
exists in practice. However, as we apply this approach to
the problem in the crude fashion suggested, difficulties
become immediately apparent. Scientists obviously do a
multitude of different things in their pursuit of knowledge. The physicist can control variables systematically
with relatively great precision; the astronomer can only
passively observe much of what interests him, but can
still be relatively precise; and the psychologist can both
observe and manipulate many of his variables, but with
relatively little or no precision. In all three instances the
objects of study differ as widely as possible, and the differences among them require equally different methodological and psychological postures toward them. Thus,
any attempt to get a comprehensive picture of the scientist would have to include a very large number of different scientists. And even if we got enough scientists to
form a composite picture - an interesting picture indeed
- it would be such a conglomeration that it would be virtually meaningless. The empiricist ( our strawman, I
should say) has not brought us very far toward an answer.
What we need is a hero who, on one hand, understands the empiricist's enthusiasm for "reality" and, on
the other hand, respects all the thinking on scientific
method that has gone into the written discourses on it.
This hero, as I indicated earlier, is the psychologist.
He could be virtually anyone but, whoever he is, he must
have the psychologist's skills and the psychologist's attitude toward the problem.
The psychologist's claim to the role of hero rests on
the following argument: According to him, the question,
•·Js there a well defined scientific argument?" has as its
referent or object a particular type of human behavior,
not method and not people. This human behavior is focused on obtaining information that must meet certain
~cientific requirements. In a sense, scientific behavior
and what we mean by method are equivalent. Scientific
behavior, like method, is a "way" from a known starting
point of old information to a terminal point of information that is regarded as both new and valid. The method
and behavior under ideal conditions are isomorphic. This
isomorphism can be seen in the correspondence between
rules as manifested in the form of symbols on paper, and
the actual behavior that follows the rules; or, the other
way around, between the behavior that was responsible
for the original formulation of the rules and the rules
themselves as they exist on paper.
Once the psychologist establishes that behavior is the
main object of his study, his next step is to find ( or invent) an appropriate unit of behavior that will constitute
Journal of, Volume Thirty-four, No. I, 1967

all aspects of the scientific process. A unit that is used
frequently among psychologists who are interested in
cognitive processes is the operation. Operations are observable acts, or acts that can be made observable, that
obtain, process, and disclose information. Scientific operations are acts that constitute the complex process of
obtaining information from the physical world, evaluating it, and producing out of it generally acceptable propositions. The scientist engaged in these operations appeals for universal assent for the propositions generated
by them. From the moment the scientist starts acting qua
scientist in response to a problematic situation, until the
moment he produces propositions that account for the
situation, he engages in a myriad of activities, some of
which are distinct, for the most part, from other human
activities, and some of which are very similar. These activities or operations constitute his method. Since they
are performed by a human, they belong to the class of
human behavior and hence are subjected to the same
analysis to which all human behavior is subjected by the
psychologist.
This approach, then, is taking the question, in a sense,
out of the realm of language and concepts and into the
realm of actuality, of events occurring in an observable
world. In this respect, it is similar to the second approach
of the empiricist, but it differs from his approach because
it draws heavily upon the first approach, as we shall
soon see, and it applies a more sophisticated and more
precise analysis to the problem, rather than limiting itself
merely to pointing to or collecting various instances.
With this in mind, let us see how a psychologist can
answer the question posed to this panel. Assume that the
scientific method consists of various operations and that
they can be described and subjected to analysis. Our first
step, then, is to attempt a gross taxonomy of operations.
A taxonomy or system of classification will allow us to
achieve some clarity about the scientific method in general and, possibly, to establish some boundaries to definitions. Most people will agree that the first step in organizing knowledge is to note similarities and differences
in things and events. The development of classificatory
schemes for things and events permits us to formulate
criteria for inclusion and exclusion that ultimately allow
generalities to be made about a wide variety of phenomena. The generalities in themselves are a major goal of
science. However, the formation of classes also allows
the scientist to make greater and greater refinements
among phenomena. In other words, the boundaries between things become increasingly precise and well defined. As far as the question put to this panel is concerned, the solution lies in this approach: Are there well
defined boundaries between the operations themselves
that make up the scientific method and are there boundaries between these operations and others that lie outside
the pale of the scientific method?
As I see it, there are two major taxonomic classifications of operations-those that are explicit, objective, and
well known enough to be transmitted to others, and
easily subjected to formal codification if necessary; and
those that are equally as important to the scientific proc-
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ess but are vague, subjective, not well understood, difficult to transmit to others, and, hence, difficult to codify.
The latter, in the strict sense, frequently fail to meet the
definition of method as described earlier. They are often
applied unsystematically or without planning, but neverthe less they represent a conventional mode of obtaining
knowledge scientifically. I will explain them in more detail later.
The first class can be broken down into two subclasses: Those operations that "operate" on objects-on
plants, water, insects, stars, human behavior-and those
that operate on data, that is, on symbolic representations
of these objects or of their properties.
In the first subclass, we include all the operations that
are involved in the process of observation. This includes
getting into perceptual contact with the object either directly through human sense organs or through some form
of instrumental mediation, such as a microscope, strain
gauge, telescope, etc. The observations may be controlled, systematic, unregulated, or opportunistic. Whatever they are, the main feature of observation is to insure
that relevant information concerning the object is "channeled" into the observer. The operations that go into performing relevant and accurate observation can be subjected to control and codification and transmitted,
through training, to others, etc. In brief, observation can
be made into a sound and reliable method.
In addition to observation there is another member of
the first sub-class and it is put under the rubric of experimentation. In essence, this subclass of operations involves any activity that exerts control over objects or
manipulates them in any way to change a property or
properties of the objects for purposes of testing, verifying, demonstrating, or validating hypotheses or theories.
Exposing guinea pigs to certain microorganisms, producing artificial erosion, freezing brains, rolling a sphere
down an inclined plane, training children to remember
nonsense syllables - all these represent operations upon
objects, operations that can be subjected to control and
systematization.
The subclass of operations that "operate" upon data
include the process of re-coding raw data into appropriate symbols for analysis. This process starts with measurement itself, whereby objects are rendered into symbolic forms, such as inches, pounds, discrete responses,
and positions on a hardness scale. It ends with the manipulation of the symbolic forms; the symbols are added,
multiplied, classified, put into frequency distributions,
converted to mean values, etc. As with the first subclass,
such operations are easy to transmit to others and are
under strict control of the canons or rules of logic and
mathematics.
There is another member of this subclass; it consists
of operations that "operate" on derivations from, or
higher-order statements about, data. Included in these
operations are such acts as reasoning deductively or inductively, and making sound generalizations or inferences. These operations go beyond the data, but they are
still under the control of the rules of logic and mathematics and are transmittable to others.
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With these two subclasses we exhaust the first major
class of operations.
The second major class is set off from the first by a
few distinguishing characteristics. First, as I said earlier,
the characteristics are difficult to specify, often hard to
transmit to others or even to be clear about oneself, and
almost impossible to subject to rules. Furthermore, they
are primarily cognitive in nature, that is, they are generally referred to as thought processes. There are many
of them, but I will list only a few: ( ] ) generating or constructing hypotheses concerning relations between variables; (2) formulating, or delimiting, a problem; (3)
asking fruitful questions; ( 4) speculating about alternative outcomes; ( 5) discovering similarities between apparently disparate observations, discovering differences,
or constructing analogies; ( 6) selecting criteria for bases
of comparisons; (7) evaluating findings; ( 8) deciding
between theoretical explanations; (9) producing explanations for findings. I am sure the list can be lengthened
as well as modified in places. The psychologist is still far
from being certain about the exact nature of many of
these operations and he is not too sure whether they are
independent or even scientifically demonstrable. It will
be some time before we understand them sufficiently.
The construction of computers and the knowledge of
their operations will undoubtedly aid us in this understanding.
Well, I have briefly covered the two major classifications, like the animal and the plant kingdoms. But what
about non-animals and non-plants? If scientific method
can be we]! defined, it will be so, in part, as a result of
our ability to point to behavioral and cognitive activities
that are not what we think of when we think of scientific
method. In other words, what human behaviors are there
that do not fit our definition?
At least two classes of such activities are worth considering: The first consists of certain aspects of common
sense. According to philosophers of science, when common sense is characterized by one or all of the following,
we refrain from considering it a useful adjunct to the scientific method: When it fails to concern itself with measurement and accuracy; when it fails to seek to correct
itself; when it puts too much emphasis on the concrete
and fails to strive for the abstract and the universal;
when it is unconcerned with pushing inquiry to its limit;
when it fails to be systematic; and, finally, when it fails
to employ an empirical test as the last recourse to settle
an issue. Undoubtedly other shortcomings of common
sense keep it out of the realm of scientific method.
The second class of activities is uncommon sense, that
is, irrational activities and illogical thoughts, such as
those that involve contradictions, absurdities, fantasies,
magical thinking, nonsequitors, etc. This class of cognitive activity disturbs scientists most of all. It is only valuable when it coincides with or illuminates reality, as
has apparently been the case in true discoveries or creations that had their geneses in flights of thought that, on
the surface, had no connection with reality whatsoever.
I don't know whether I have satisfactorily answered·
the question put to the panel. In fact, instead of cutting
The Minnesota Academy of Science

down on the work of inquiry that must be done, as all
answers should do, I have created more work. Nevertheless, I have tried to present a way by which we can answer the question. Scientific method is a polymorphous
concept if there ever was one. Although it has numerous
referents, a systematic attempt to create a taxonomy
aimed at increasing the number of classes so that the
referents become increasingly more distinct from one
another will, I think, reformulate the question so that it
can be answered.
For me at this stage of the taxonomy, only a minute
part of the question has been answered. Some aspects of
the scientific method appear to be well defined, that is,
they cannot be confused with neighboring aspects . Other
aspects are not clear at all, and this is because psychologists have not yet developed a satisfactory taxonomy of
the behavioral and cognitive operations themselves.
However, psychologists eventually will. And, I should
add, the child psychologist who is particularly interested
in the development of cognitive processes will eventually
make an important contribution to the development of
this ideal taxonomy. This may sound odd, but there is
good historical reason to believe it. The genetic method
( often referred to as the evolutionary, comparative, or
historical method) has often been successfu'l in clarifying an area and helping with the formation of a taxonomy. This method was used in comparative philology in
the eighteenth century and later in biology. Today in
psychology it is being employed by Jean Piaget and
others to discover the nature of adult cognitive processes
through a careful and painstaking analysis of earlier
forms of such processes that characterize the child's ( and
even the infant's) thinking and cognitively guided actions. For example, Inhelder and Piaget (1958) and
Piaget (1960) have demonstrated, although admittedly
not to everyone's satisfaction, that much of scientific
thinking is reducible to formal operations, such as those
found in logic and mathematics. He has shown that
much of the latter is developmentally reducible to concrete operations, which appear in the late elementaryschool child, and which in turn, have developed out of
intuitions that occur in the preschool period. And believe
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it or not, the intuitions, Piaget feels, are derived from
sensorimotor behaviors that characterize the infant when
he is faced with life's little problems (Inhelder and
Piaget, 1964) .
I spend time telling you about Piaget because a multitude of things scientists do as part of their methods may
not appear to be related superficially to each other. However, they may have descended from a common ontogenetic ancestor, as Piaget has been able to show in quite
a few instances (for example, adult classificatory behavior is clearly developmentally related to the groups of
objects spontaneously formed by the young child). At
any rate, as a child psychologist specializing in this area,
I can only assure you that a taxonomy of scientific operations partly based on the genetic method has a good
chance of surviving.
And here is the moral of my story and my challenge
to philosophy: There are many philosophical issues that
need no extensive up-to-date knowledge of the empirical
order. But there are also many issues that inevitab ly
mesh with empirical problems in the most unavoidable
way. These are the issues and problems that are faced
mostly, I assume, by philosophers of science. Many of
these problems are ultimately related to human behavior
or human cognition ( there is no question that epistemology is inextricably tied up with psychological phenomenon). Since this is the case, I see no reason why the
psychological expert should not be ca11ed in to help out,
especially when the philosophical question is aimed at
obtaining a precise and unequivocal answer about the
way things are in nature.
1
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